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THE EFFECTIVEESS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
ACT (VAWA) IN CREATING SYSTEM-LEVEL CHANGE  
 
TARA ADAY 
Grand Valley State University 
 
Abstract 
With the understanding that gendered violence is an issue that 
does not exist in silos, this article seeks to analyze the effectiveness of the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in creating a system-wide response to 
stalking, domestic abuse, and sexual violence. Although these crimes are a 
prevailing social issue, until the passage of VAWA in 1994, little concerted 
effort existed between sectors or across agencies to respond to and meet the 
needs of those affected by these types of violence. In addition to providing 
an analysis of the partnership and funding between the public and nonprofit 
sectors, this article also examines changes in legislation and rates of 
victimization as indicators of system-level change. This article concludes 
that although VAWA has achieved great success in the immediacy, there are 
potential barriers related to the sustainability of the legislation’s desired 
long-term change. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Intimate partner violence, often referred to as domestic violence or 
domestic abuse, is a national issue, affecting 1 in 4 women and 1 in 7 men 
(Breiding, Smith, Basile, Walters, Chen, & Merrick, 2011). Nearly 1 in 5 
women and 1 in 59 men in the United States have been raped in their 
lifetime (Breiding et al., 2011). One in 6 women have been stalked during 
their lifetime, comparable to 1 in 19 men (Breiding et al., 2011). While 
research is limited, in part due to the lack of statistically significant data, 
studies suggest rates are even higher among marginalized communities, 
including women of color, the LGBTQ community, individuals with 
disabilities, and Native communities (Walters, Chen, & Breiding, 2013). 
Yet, until 1994, there was little concerted effort to respond and combat 
these realities (Biden, 19994). Moreover, lack of consistency in state and 
federal law regarding domestic and sexual violence made it hard for law 
enforcement to prosecute and prevent repeat offenders from committing 
future crimes. For example, when the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) passed in 1994, almost one quarter of convicted rapists were 
never sent to prison, and nearly one-third of all American women homicide 
victims were murdered by a current or former intimate partner (Biden, 
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1994). Organizations attempting to respond to gender-based violence 
(GBV) through crisis centers, nurse examiner programs, counseling, 
technical assistance, and preventative educational outreach—among other 
services—received minimal federal dollars; little collaboration existed 
between the public, nonprofit, and private sector (Biden, 1994).  
In 1994, Congress passed VAWA in an attempt to create 
community-coordinated responses to the way in which crimes against 
women and men were investigated and prosecuted, as well as how they 
were prevented. The 1994 legislation signified the first time federal 
legislation acknowledged domestic and sexual violence as crimes. VAWA 
allows for formula-based and discretionary grant funding to state, local, and 
tribal governments, nonprofits, and private organizations addressing issues 
related to gender- based violence—intimate partner violence, sexual assault, 
and stalking. While additional private support still accounts for funding of 
GBV initiatives, VAWA remains a primary funding stream for agencies 
intervening and responding to issues of GBV (Sacco, 2013). Since 1994, the 
legislation has been reauthorized three additional times in 2000, 2005, and 
2013. During each of these reauthorizations, additional measures were 
added to more holistically address GBV crimes.  
The long-term goal of VAWA is to “effect institutionalized system 
change, such that victims encounter a positive and effective response from 
the criminal and civil justice systems, and from community agencies 
offering services and supports” (Zweig & Burt, 2002). This paper sets out to 
examine the effectiveness of the Violence Against Women Act in its ability 
to serve victims/survivors of GBV, but more importantly, its ability to 
prevent future acts of violence, which in effect would be a representation of 
institutionalized system change. This includes a meta-analysis of the 
collaborative efforts between the public and nonprofit sector on issues 
related to GBV, and whether current approaches to GBV response and 
prevention are efficient and effective. On a broader level, this paper will 
look at the ability of public policy to create system-level change.  
 
Historical Background of Advocacy Efforts and Their Effects on 
Government Policy 
 
Before Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act, social 
movements, such as Second Wave and Third Wave Feminism emerged, 
developing theory and urging government to change how they addressed 
problems once perceived solely as private issues. Weldon (2002) suggests 
Second Wave Feminism became a driving force behind the increased 
discussion of the political public sphere versus the private sphere, as it 
related to gender justice and equality. As a result, she argues the 
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mobilization of the Battered Women’s Movement—a reflection of second 
and third wave feminism—served as a key catalyst to policy change in the 
United States in the 1980s and 1990s. By bringing private issues into the 
public, the Battered Women’s Movement challenged many of the social 
norms and attitudes that affected women, and as a result demanded greater 
representation and protection of traditionally and historically marginalized 
populations.  
Weldon (2011) suggests much of the ideology behind the Battered 
Women’s Movement, and its ability to permeate the public sector, brought 
attention to the need for systemic change within the larger community. As a 
social movement, these stakeholders advocated for increased 
institutionalization of the response and intervention of violence against 
women. While not the only driving force behind VAWA, the Battered 
Women’s Movement played a critical role in the creation of this legislation. 
It also reflects a push for greater accountability on behalf of the government 
and increased partnership between sectors, an effort that will be addressed 
later in this paper.  
An additional point to be made about the response and advocacy 
efforts around violence against women prior to the authorization of VAWA 
is the relative organizational independence from the government these 
social movements maintained. In many ways, this created issues regarding 
the prosecution of these crimes and revealed a needed collaboration 
between law enforcement and the nonprofit sector, but as Weldon (2002) 
suggests, it is not to say that these social movements were ineffective in 
creating system-level change prior to the enactment of VAWA. Instead, 
VAWA’s enactment represented a shift in government responsiveness, 
recognizing violence against women as a category of national government 
action (Weldon, 2002). 
This shift can best be illustrated by the change from status quo and 
policy stagnation in the 1960s and 1970s to legislative action in the 1980s 
and 1990s. In 1984, the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence 
released a report, asserting violence between intimate partners is no longer a 
“family matters” issue, and therefore could no longer be an issue addressed 
solely within the household (Department of Justice, 1984, p. iii). The task 
force made nearly 50 recommendations across the public and nonprofit 
sectors, advocating for greater cooperation between the criminal justice 
system and providers of social services (Department of Justice, 1984).  
Shortly following the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family 
Violence’s report, Congress enacted the Family Violence Prevention and 
Services Act (FVPSA). Narrow in scope, the legislation addressed 
components of the task force’s recommendations, but failed to 
comprehensively address domestic violence. In response to these gaps of 
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service and reluctance between sectors to increase partnership, Congress 
passed VAWA in 1994. Originally passed as Title IV of the Violence Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, VAWA became the first and 
only piece of legislation to take a comprehensive approach, primarily 
through funding, to serving victims/survivors and preventing further 
instances of GBV crimes. 
 
Overview of the Violence Against Women Act  
 
 VAWA, which has been reauthorized by Congress three times 
since its inception, is still premised on two goals: 
1. Enhance investigations and prosecutions of offenders 
2. Provide for a number of grant programs to address the 
issue of violence against women from a variety of angles 
including law enforcement, public and private entities and 
service providers, and victims of crime (Congressional 
Research Service, 2012, p.2).  
While the desired short-term and long-term outcomes within these larger 
goals have evolved and changed over the years, the focus remains the same.  
Investigation and Prosecution. In large part, early success of 
VAWA came in the form of policy reform and implementation. In addition 
to recognizing domestic violence, stalking, and sexual violence as a federal 
crime, the enacted law began to provide a basis for the investigation and 
prosecution of these crimes. As a result of the legislation, new offenses and 
penalties were established for the violation of a protection order as well as 
issues related to the prosecution of offenders crossing state lines or entering 
into territories or tribal communities (Congressional Research Service, 
2012). VAWA also established pretrial detention mandates for crimes of 
sexual offense and increased penalties for an array of sex offenses, among 
other things. 
 During the 2000 reauthorization of VAWA, Congress enhanced 
penalties for domestic violence and stalking and added protections for 
abused foreign nationals (Sacco, 2013). Again during the 2005 
reauthorization, Congress increased penalties for crimes against women, 
namely repeat offenders (Sacco, 2013).  
Grant Programs. In addition to changing laws on the state and 
federal level, the major output of VAWA was the creation of a funding 
stream for agencies in all sectors responding to GBV crimes or providing 
services to the victims/survivors of these crimes. Since FY2012, VAWA 
has authorized and/or enacted funding to 33 discretionary and formula grant 
programs, which are administered primarily by the Office on Violence 
Against Women (OVW), but are also administered by the Office of Justice 
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Programs, Department of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Health and Human Services. These grants cover three areas of 
focus: violence prevention, investigations and prosecutions, and victim 
services (Sacco, 2013).  
Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors Grant Program. 
There are many different funding components of VAWA, but one of the 
primary ways the federal government provides funding across the sectors is 
through Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors (STOP) grants. Of 
current grant programs, the STOP Grant Program is the highest spending 
program, and funding for this program continued to grow through fiscal 
year 2010. Between the fiscal years 2007-2012, the federal government 
authorized $1.4 billion solely for STOP grant funding, compared to $800 
million dollars between fiscal years 1995-2000 (Aron & Newmark, 1999; 
Congressional Research Service, 2010). 
The purpose of this formula grant program is to support state and 
territorial governments, localities(including law enforcement), and human 
service providers by developing and strengthening law enforcement and 
prosecution strategies to “combat violence crimes against women, and to 
develop and strengthen victim services in cases involving violence crimes 
against women” (Aron & Newmark, 1999). As a condition of STOP 
funding, agencies must use the funding in one of seven areas: training for 
law enforcement or prosecution; special law enforcement or prosecution 
units; policy development for law enforcement or prosecution; development 
of data and communication systems; direct victim services; programs 
addressing stalking; or grants to Native American tribes (Aron & Newmark, 
1999).  A majority of this article will focus on the STOP grants, given the 
size of its budget and its relatively large focus as it relates to program inputs 
(cross-sector partnership) and program outcomes.  
Funding. The reauthorization of VAWA in 2000 and 2005 brought 
a general increase in funding authorization and appropriation for grant 
programs (CRS, 2010). However, since FY2011, there has been a 
significant decrease in overall funding across programs. Even with the 2013 
VAWA reauthorization, funding is still significantly below that of the 
second reauthorization. Table 1 provides an overview of total appropriated 
funds for VAWA since 1994 (CRS, 2008; CRS, 2010; CRS, 2015). Table 2 
provides an overview of the five highest funded grant programs under 
VAWA between FY2012-FY2015 (CRS, 2008; CRS, 2010; CRS, 2015). 
While the STOP Grant Program receives the most funding, this grant also 
provides funding, through set-aside funding, for other VAWA authorized 
programs such as the Tribal Government Program, The State Coalitions 
Program, and the Tribal Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Coalitions 
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Program. However, the STOP Grant Program is still the highest funded 
program even when these funds are removed from its annual budget. 
 
Table 1: Enacted VAWA Funding by Fiscal Year 
FISCAL YEAR 
TOTAL ENACTED FUNDS 
ACROSS ALL GRANT 
PROGRAMS (in millions) 
1995 $27.00 
1996 $227.10 
1997 $258.50 
1998 $420.75 
1999 $438.75 
2000 $453.25 
2001 $407.11 
2002 $517.22 
2003 $519.98 
2004 $517.11 
2005 $517.18 
2006 $559.22 
2007 $558.92 
2008 $525.47 
2009 $595.31 
2010 $625.91 
2011 $475.76 
2012 $456.39 
2013 $432.63 
2014 $461.00 
2015 $474.53 
 
It is important to examine this funding because it provides an 
overview of funding priorities, which have remained relatively consistent, 
in terms of distribution across programs, since 1995 (CRS, 2008; CRS, 
2010; CRS, 2015). Table 2 also provides a snapshot of how funding is 
distributed across service delivery (i.e. Rural grant) versus primary 
prevention (i.e. Rape Prevention and Education Grant). It is also important 
to note that most programs fund different sectors at comparable rates (CRS, 
2015). In other words, government agencies receive comparable funding to 
the amount of funding nonprofits receive across programs that are available 
to both sectors (CRS, 2015; CRS, 2010).  
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Office on Violence Against Women 
 
 Finally, VAWA also allowed for the creation of the Office on 
Violence Against Women (OVW), a branch of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ). The primary role of this department is to administer funding to 
grantees, but it is also responsible for the facilitation of technical assistance 
across sectors.  
      Currently, OVW administers 24 grant programs authorized by VAWA. 
Since OVW’s inception, it has awarded over $6 billion in grants (CRS, 
2015; CRS, 2010; CRS, 2008). In many ways, OVW represents a multi-
faceted approach to violence prevention and intervention that motivated the 
original authorization of VAWA. Through its funding, OVW is able to 
convene and forge partnerships between state, local, and tribal partnerships 
among law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and direct-service providers. 
A further analysis of the development of OVW can be found in the 
discussion of the effectiveness of government contracting. 
 
Impacts and Shortcomings of VAWA 
 
 For the most part, successes of VAWA are measured using a 
quantifiable approach. As federal agencies such as the National Institute of 
Justice (NIJ) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
assess rates of victimization, Congress and the White House are able to 
utilize these reports in Congressional hearings surrounding the 
reauthorization of the legislation (CRS, 2015). While grantees are 
responsible for reporting data, this data is often output based. For example, 
reporting data is usually limited to short-term data and process evaluation, 
such as number of individuals served or types of services provided, but does 
not include longitudinal evaluation or an assessment of the outcomes. This 
creates barriers in comprehensively measuring the successes and impact of 
the act, and currently, there is no national evaluation of VAWA (Zweig & 
Burt, 2002). 
       Lastly, when assessing the impacts of VAWA, it is important to 
note that much of the literature is limited to the social impact of VAWA and 
ignores potential achievements or shortcomings within the realm of public 
administration. Moreover, data that is often cited by Congress and the 
White House when discussing successes of VAWA lacks consistency. For 
example, in 2012 the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reported that from 
1994 to 2010, the overall rate of intimate partner violence in the United 
States declined by 64 percent, from 9.8 victimizations per 1,000 persons in 
1994 to 3.6 per 1,000 in 2010.  
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Table 2: Highest Funded VAWA Grant Programs (FY2011-FY2015) 
 
Grant Program Purpose/Goal 
Grant 
Administer 
Organizations 
Eligible to Apply 
FY2012-
FY2015 
Enacted 
Funding 
(in millions) 
Services, Training, 
Officers, and 
Prosecutors 
(STOP) Grant 
Program 
Enhance advocacy and 
improve criminal 
justice system’s 
response to violence 
crimes against women 
Office on Violence 
Against Women 
(DOJ) 
States and territories 
(including tribal 
governments, units of 
local governments, and 
nonprofit, 
nongovernmental 
victim service 
programs as sub-
grantees) 
$962.63 
Grants to 
Encourage Arrest 
Policies and 
Enforcement of 
Protection Orders 
Program 
Increase involvement 
of entire criminal 
justice system; 
encourage state, local, 
and tribal governments 
to treat GBV as a 
serious crime 
Office on Violence 
Against Women 
(DOJ) 
States and territories; 
units of local 
government; tribal 
governments; and 
state, local, tribal, and 
territorial courts 
$256.44 
Civil Legal 
Assistance for 
Victims Grant 
Program 
Strengthen civil and 
criminal legal 
assistance programs 
for adults and youth 
victims/survivors of 
GBV who are seeking 
legal action in matters 
arising as a 
consequence of that 
abuse or violence 
Office on Violence 
Against Women 
(DOJ) 
Nonprofit entities; 
territorial 
organizations; tribal 
governments and 
organizations; 
publically funded 
organizations not 
acting in a government 
capacity (i.e. law 
schools) 
$199.60 
Rape Prevention 
and Education 
Grants 
Strengthen sexual 
violence prevention 
efforts in the states and 
territories; increase 
awareness of GBV 
through education and 
hotline operations 
Center for Disease 
Control and 
Prevention (HHS) 
States and territories; 
nonprofit organizations 
$193.03 
Rural Domestic 
Violence, Dating 
Violence, Sexual 
Assault, Stalking, 
and Child Abuse 
Enforcement 
Enhance services 
available to children, 
youth and adult 
victims/survivors of 
GBV in rural 
communities 
Office on Violence 
Against Women 
(DOJ) 
States and territories; 
Tribal governments; 
local governments; 
nonprofits (including 
tribal). Must be 
proposing to serve 
rural areas or rural 
communities 
$177.31 
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This data was captured by the National Crime Victimization Survey, which 
collects information on nonfatal crimes reported and not reported to the 
police from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. In 2014, 
the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control—a Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention entity—reported 24.3 percent of women 
and 13.8 percent of men experienced intimate partner violence at some 
point in their lifetime (Walters et al.). This data was collected through the 
2010 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS), a 
self-reporting survey that is representative of the national landscape. In 
short, these sets of data, though using the same understanding of intimate 
partner violence and relatively similar time period, show an inconsistent 
rate of victimization. While the National Institute of Justice recognizes the 
differences in rates of victimization between these two surveys, citing the 
context in which the two surveys are administered—the BJS’s survey 
measures IPV within the context of general crime victimization, while 
NISVS asks more behaviorally-oriented questions solely addressing GBV—
it is important to note that government-funded agencies tend to cite the 
more favorable statistics when addressing impacts of VAWA (NIJ, 2010). 
      Despite these challenges, the literature around the impact of VAWA 
does highlight some areas of goal attainment, especially as it relates to focus 
areas of the legislation: improve the criminal justice response; ensure that 
victims and their families have access to the services; and create positive 
change (Zweig & Burt, 2002). The sections below outline these 
achievements.  
 
Increased Collaboration 
 
 One of the continued successes of the act is increased partnerships 
between the sectors. As illustrated above the STOP Grant Program puts 
particular emphasis on the collaboration of community agencies including 
law enforcement, prosecution, the courts, health care, and social service 
agencies. In addition to the broader program goals listed above, Zweig and 
Burt (2004) assert a more narrowly-defined, long-term goal of the STOP 
program: 
Promote institutionalized system change throughout communities 
that results in supportive and effective responses from the criminal 
and civil justice systems, and other community agencies such as 
domestic violence and sexual assault programs (p.613). 
However, as Zweig and Burt (2004) illustrate, there has been little research 
conducted on the long-term outcome of these partnerships and their ability 
to create this system change. Despite the lack of comprehensive assessment, 
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the authors suggest the institutionalization of these efforts has led to a 
decrease in total victimization, and more specifically, a decrease in repeat 
offenders (Zweig & Burt, 2004). They argue this is not only because law 
enforcement agencies are effectively prosecuting the offender, but social 
service agencies, such as domestic violence shelters, are able to remove the 
victim and engage this person in continued support through psycho-
educational groups. This empowers the victim to create change in her life, 
and decreases the chances that she will return to the offender (Zweig & 
Burt, 2004). In short, funding through STOP grants contributed to improved 
and increased services for victims, and the coordinated response between 
agencies also increased the quality of service (Zweig & Burt, 2004). 
 Similarly, the Greenbook National Evaluation Team assessed the 
effectiveness of DOJ and HHS grants awarded across sectors aimed at 
increasing cross-sector collaboration in an effort to improve practices, 
services, and outcomes for children and families experiencing the co-
occurrence of IPV and child abuse (2008). These VAWA-funded grants 
were awarded to child welfare agencies, domestic violence service 
providers, and the dependency courts. The Greenbook concluded that major 
collaboration developed and even expanded over time, but this was not 
without challenges. In particular, grantees reported difficulties in engaging 
across systems due to philosophical difference among partners and 
differences in organizational structures, power, and authority. While the 
courts and child welfare agencies represented formal systems, domestic 
violence agencies were more grassroots oriented and held less power in 
larger systems. This at times proved to be a barrier to collaboration 
(Greenbook, 2008). 
 
Reduction of Victimization  
 
 As noted above, the literature generally suggests a decrease in 
criminal victimization as a result of VAWA. The NIJ reports on 
victimization, conducted since the initial authorization of VAWA, suggest 
fatal assault, nonfatal rape and sexual assault, and nonfatal assault, 
including physical and verbal/mental abuse, all consistently decreased since 
1997 (Clark, Biddle, & Martin, 2002; BJS, DOJ, 2012). In addition to 
statistics reported above, the Bureau of Justice also reports that between 
1993 and 2007, the rate of intimate partner homicides of females decreased 
35 percent, and the rate of intimate partner homicides of males decreased 46 
percent (2012).  
 Although these federal reports suggest a decrease of victimization, 
Zweig and Burt (2004) are a bit more critical of the idea that there is a 
causal relationship between VAWA and overall reduction in crime. As they 
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suggest, all violent crime decreased during this time period, not just forms 
of GBV (Zweig & Burt, 2004).  
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
      In addition to measuring the reduced rate of victimization, another 
means of evaluating the success of VAWA is through a cost-benefit 
analysis. As Clark et al. (2002) and Conyers (2007) illustrate, there are 
inherent issues in conducting this type of analysis, primarily because of the 
difficulty in assigning a cost to the nontangible losses of human life, and 
other long-term effects of violence, including emotional pain and overall 
reduced quality of life. Despite these difficulties, Clark et al. (2002) are still 
able to conclude that the benefits far exceed the cost of VAWA (2002). At 
the time of the author’s report, Clark et al. (2002) makes a conservative 
estimate that the cost to serve one victim is $15.50, but results in $47 in 
averted costs. Clark et al. (2002) conclude many of these cost savings come 
from a reduction in health care service needs and lessened law enforcement 
costs for continued charges against repeat offenders (Clark et al., 2002).  
 
Specialization of Bureaucrats  
 
 As Van Slyke (2007) argues, one of the strongest arguments in the 
expansion of the scope of the nonprofit sector is its ability to provide 
expertise, especially as it relates to the human services. Through VAWA 
funding, many nonprofit organizations are able to increase capacity and 
infrastructure. However, this does not eliminate the role of the public sector, 
and although this sector is highly professionalized, gaps of service often 
arise because bureaucrats do not have the expertise to efficiently and 
effectively deliver a given service as it relates to GBV. VAWA addressed 
this issue through its emphasis on continued learning and education, namely 
its funding for the continued training of the public sector. As a result, an 
additional impact of VAWA is the increased specialization of bureaucrats. 
As noted above, the STOP Grant Program remains one of the top 
funding priorities of VAWA, with a significant portion going towards 
improving the response and intervention of law enforcement, prosecutors, 
and the courts (CRS, 2015). As Meyer-Emerick argues, inaccurate issue 
literacy not only affects how policy is created, but it can also hinder the 
implementation of these policies, and subsequently the response of 
bureaucrats, namely law enforcement (2002). For example, if a police 
officer does not understand the warning signs of domestic violence, victims 
face an additional barrier in reporting the crime and seeking justice; a police 
officer might not recognize an instance of GBV, and as a result neglect to 
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identify it as such in a police report, which subsequently can make it harder 
for a victim/survivor to receive a method of protection, such as a Personal 
Protection Order. This in turn increases the danger to the victim/survivor. 
  Although Meyer-Emerick is somewhat critical of the VAWA and 
its funding of the law enforcement, largely because of the inherent power 
imbalance of profession and its tendency to disproportionately attract 
perpetrators of violent crimes, her analysis points to positive outcomes of 
increased specialization. She argues that one way to get at the core issues of 
violence against women is to get at the root cause of the violence. By 
challenging bureaucrats to change how they perceive violence against 
women, especially in their recognition of violence against women as a 
crime, the way the government responds to this crime might also change. 
 This analysis is supported by Burt, Zweig, Schlichter, and 
Andrews (2000) evaluation of the STOP Grant Program. Relevant to the 
discussion of increased specialization of bureaucrats, the authors note two 
key findings: STOP funding resulted in increased training of law 
enforcement and prosecution; and STOP funding resulted in over half of 
victim services programs providing policy and protocol development 
(2000). As government continues to privatize and cut specialization within 
different agencies, VAWA puts more pressure on bureaucrats to uphold this 
degree of specialization, which as Burt et al. (2000) indicate, increases the 
quality of service victims/survivors receive when accessing services in the 
public sector. 
 
Public Management Challenges 
 
 One of the key issues that arises as a result of VAWA is the 
potential inability of the federal government to efficiently and effectively 
manage the grants and contracts that are awarded to the private and 
nonprofit sector. As a blurring of the sectors continues, it also becomes 
increasingly difficult to identify means for holding organizations 
accountable for the fulfillment of the program’s desired outcomes. 
Additionally, as privatization of social services increases, which at times 
VAWA represents, the likelihood of the mismanagement of funding 
increases (Van Slyke, 2002). The sections below examine some of the 
barriers to system-level change that are created as a result of 
mismanagement of federal grants as it relates to VAWA. As expanded on 
below, many of the management challenges are rooted in capacity and the 
difficulties relatively small departments face in administering large grants to 
multiple program sites.  
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Evaluation 
 
Potentially one of the largest shortcomings of VAWA is the lack of 
any comprehensive evaluation of the legislation. While grant programs such 
as the STOP grant emphasize some degree of reporting to the OVW, most 
of the current grant programs do not have any comprehensive assessment 
requirements (Boba & Lilley, 2009). In other words, while grantees might 
be required to report the number of clients served or law enforcement might 
be required to report the number of individuals convicted of crimes related 
to GBV, there is no evaluation model that requires these programs to look at 
their services at all levels. Boba and Lilley (2009) suggest this is a result of 
the diversity of focus and breadth of VAWA-funded programs. Somewhat 
similarly, Klein, Brown, Small, Tucker, Fischer, and Walsh(2009) indicate 
in the evaluation of a rural grant program that although Congress mandated 
that the program include an evaluation under the auspices of NIJ, the 
program itself was not equipped to accommodate a rigorous outcome or 
impact evaluation. 
  Additionally, despite benefits of conducting continual program 
evaluation, few organizations engage or invest in this practice without it 
being a funding requirement. Those that do engage in evaluation often see it 
as nothing more than a requirement of a grant, and therefore invest little 
into the process of continual learning and application that is the foundation 
of Evaluation Capacity Building (ECB). While the literature specific to the 
importance of ECB within GBV organizations is limited, Mark, Gary 
Henry, and Julnes (2000) provide an overview of the importance of this 
practice, especially when trying to evaluate change in behavior—a key 
desired outcome of VAWA. Reasons to engage in ECB include: evaluation 
is a means of assessing the merit and worth of a program; evaluation is a 
process for uncovering opportunity for program improvement; evaluation 
can be an accountability tool to ensure compliance and maintain oversight; 
and evaluation leads to knowledge development—both external and 
internal.  
ECB is a method of evaluation that promotes the continual process 
of evaluation (Mark et al., 2000).  Instead of being output-focused, like 
much of the reporting requirements of VAWA, ECB would increase the 
likelihood that organizations, especially those providing direct service, look 
beyond the immediate needs of the clients—shelter, medical needs—and 
instead look at the root causes of the issues, which would better address 
system-level change.  
      While current Congressional Research Service reports do not indicate 
plans to increase capacity around evaluation—internally or externally—the 
CDC has taken steps to increase organizational learning among its grantees 
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so that they can engage in evaluation (CRS, 2015; CRS, 2010, CRS 2008). 
As DeGue, Simon, Basile, Lin Yee, Lang, and Spivak (2012) suggest, the 
CDC continues to advocate for an increase of funding for Rape Prevention 
and Education Grant Program so technical assistance can be provided 
around evaluation and assessment. More importantly, this request for 
additional funds and the overall lack of system-level evaluation points to the 
overall shortcomings in the management of these grants. As DeGue et al. 
(2012) suggest, without funding to conduct evaluation through VAWA, 
organizations do not have the resources to engage in this practice. The 
authors also suggest that without funding to assess the strategies of the 
grantees, the organizations are less likely to engage in innovative 
approaches to problem solving for fear of losing funding if the new 
approach does not meet previously-set output goals (DeGue et al. 2012). As 
it relates to the original research question, it appears as though a lack of 
adequate ECB-related funding from the federal grant administers is 
preventing organizations from moving beyond output-focused 
programming.  
 
New Street Level Bureaucrats 
 
 Van Slyke (2007) provides an overview of why governments often 
look to increase partnerships with the nonprofit sector. Of these reasons, 
there are a few that are especially applicable to VAWA: their expertise in 
providing certain types of services; their proximity to clients and 
communities in need; and their perceived mission and goal alignment with 
government’s mission (Van Slyke, 2007). As a result of this partnership and 
the overall devolution of government services, Van Slyke (2007) asserts a 
new street level bureaucrat is created, in which the public no longer views 
the government as the sole provider of social services. While this does not 
immediately create a challenge, as supported by Burt et al.’s evaluation, it 
does pose challenges if VAWA funding that supported these services 
cannot be sustained. In noting the overall decreased funding Congress has 
authorized for VAWA since FY 2011, this challenge might have an 
increased likelihood of growing (Table 1).  
 As it relates to public administration and management of VAWA, 
there are several issues with this potential redefining of the public sector 
and nonprofit sector. First, Van Slyke (2007) suggests nonprofits are 
significantly limited in their ability to achieve the overarching funding 
requirements of the government. In the case of VAWA, the overall goals 
would be to create system-level change, including the way institutions 
engage in their larger system. Underlining this issue of the limitations of 
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nonprofits is the fact that government agencies do not have the capacity to 
evaluate the performance of these partners, which holds especially true for  
OVW given the thousands of grants its relatively small staff oversees (Van 
Slyke, 2007).  
 An additional issue created by the blurring of lines is the issue of 
accountability. While nonprofits are sharing the responsibility to administer 
GBV services, the government is usually the one held accountable by the 
people when service is not delivered or when it is delivered ineffectively. 
This issue is further exacerbated by the lack of evaluation, as discussed in 
the previous section, because the government is not even able to detect the 
ineffective service (Van Slyke, 2007). As Van Slyke (2007) asserts, the 
increased reliance on nonprofit organizations creates issues in how 
accountability is preserved and maintained, how public responsibilities are 
identified, and how constituents file grievances.  
 
Suppressed Advocacy 
 
 Another potential barrier to system-level change is the potential for 
VAWA to suppress further advocacy efforts among grassroots and 
nonprofit organizations because the nation’s response to GBV has become 
so institutionalized (Kramer, 1981). As Salamon (2002) illustrates, 
government funding accounted for 37 percent of nonprofits’ revenue in 
1995, up 6 percent from 1977. While the degree of federal funding a 
nonprofit organization receives varies, there are few that do not receive any 
federal funding (Salamon, 2002). The percentage of federal funding 
nonprofit organizations receive increases even more for organizations 
providing services related to GBV (Zweig & Burt, 2002). For many 
organizations, especially nonprofits with an annual budget over $1 million, 
VAWA-funded grants are often one of the primary sources for program 
funding (Sweig & Burt, 2002). Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz (2004) 
suggest this degree of dependence on federal funding has a significant 
influence on the political activity of nonprofit organizations, especially 
those that do not view advocacy as a primary component of their mission. 
Additionally, those that recognize the need to create system-level reform 
often refrain from challenging components of VAWA because they fear a 
reduction in funding as a result of their advocacy efforts. This don’t-bite-
the-hand-that-feeds-you mentality is among the most cited reasons by 
human-service nonprofits for not engaging in any degree of advocacy 
(Chaves et al., 2004).  
 As Hatch (2013) illustrates, power and funding dependency are 
also closely related. If an organization has multiple sources of funding, it 
has more relative power. As dependency of one funding source goes up, 
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power goes down (Hatch, 2013). This holds true across all sectors, but again 
is especially applicable to the nonprofit sector. Weldon (2002) suggests 
grassroots organizations addressing violence against women in the early 
1990s had more relative power than those today because they were not 
dependent on any singular funding stream. As illustrated, VAWA has led 
many organizations to weaken the diversity of their funding sources 
because, for the most part, it has remained a consistent funding stream. 
 As mentioned in the background section, the Battered Women’s 
Movement effectively improved government responsiveness to violence 
against women (Weldon, 2002). This is a representation of its power. The 
social movement created institutionalized change through the creation of 
VAWA, institutions such as OVW, and reformed federal policy such as 
stricter convictions. Yet, as Weldon (2002) suggests, political activism 
significantly decreased following the passage of the VAWA because many 
of the community organizers saw an achievement in their goals. For the 
most part, continued reauthorizations of VAWA represent the government’s 
agenda around issues of violence—an agenda that consistently gave way to 
increased funding. 
 Ultimately, suppressed political activity or decreased advocacy 
results in less system-level change (Kramer, 1981). As the federal 
government continues to increase funding to a larger number of agencies 
across the sectors, but fails to increase assessment components, the ability 
to detect ineffective approaches or gaps in service delivery decreases. This 
makes it more likely that programs will neglect to reach long-term 
outcomes because long-term accountability is not created nor sustained. As 
it relates to advocacy and system-wide change, VAWA seems to give way 
to complacency as opposed to continued reform (Weldon, 2002).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 While it still remains difficult to evaluate the overall success of 
VAWA in effectively creating system-level change, there are measurable 
outcomes that seem to support this idea. VAWA led to policy reform that 
allowed law enforcement to prosecute individuals for crimes related to 
GBV. The act also provides funding for the much-needed services of 
victims/survivors in addition to allocating significant funding for increased 
technical assistance across sectors. As the literature suggests, this has 
helped to increase understanding of the crimes as well as service delivery 
across systems. 
 However, there are still significant issues regarding VAWA that 
are primarily rooted in the public sector management of the increasing 
number and focus of its grant programs. Although VAWA created OVW, 
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an approach that was intended to create better avenues for management of 
the grant programs, the literature suggests there are still significant capacity 
issues. In particular, long-term outcome evaluation is not consistently taking 
place, which makes it hard to assess the overall success of the act. 
Additionally, the public’s increased dependence on the nonprofit sector 
creates a myriad of issues related to public management and sustainability.  
      Ultimately, VAWA is representative of many of the challenges that 
arise as a result of the increased blurring of the roles and responsibilities of 
the public and nonprofit sector. While this article highlights some of the 
benefits of increased collaboration, it also shows how resource dependency 
can lead to a decrease in power and influence. While there is a role for both 
sectors in the prevention, intervention, and response of GBV, it becomes 
difficult to assess the degree to which the sectors are achieving system 
change without a culture of continued evaluation. Moreover, as the 
government continues to increase the scope of its funding under VAWA, it 
becomes more important to assess the capacity needed to efficiently manage 
these funds. While it is important to address problems of GBV, it is also 
important only to take on programs within the capacity of the managing 
agency.  
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